Under the system of approval voting, each voter can approve of as many candidates as she wishes and the election winners are those candidates that obtain the most approvals. A voter is said to have voted sincerely if she prefers all those candidates she approved of to all other candidates. We analyse the incentives of voters to vote sincerely under approval voting. As there can be a set of winning candidates rather than just a single winner, these incentives will depend on what assumptions we are willing to make regarding the principles by which voters extend their preferences over individual candidates to preferences over sets of candidates. We show that for certain choices regarding these assumptions voters will never have an incentive to vote insincerely. This is true for elections with small numbers of candidates under very weak assumptions, and for elections with arbitrary numbers of candidates under somewhat stronger assumptions.
Introduction
Approval voting (AV) is a voting procedure that allows each voter to approve of as many candidates as she desires and that declares the candidate(s) collecting the most approvals the winner(s) of the election (Weber, 1978; Brams and Fishburn, 1978, 2007) . AV has been strongly advocated by some, and severely criticised by others. While there may be no clear-cut conclusion to this debate, it is certainly true that AV has found its place as one of the major election systems studied in economic theory and political science and it is also widely used in practice. Brams (2008) , for instance, cites the use of AV to elect the secretary-general of the United Nations and its adoption by numerous professional societies, including the American Mathematical Society (AMS), the Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences (INFORMS) , and the Society for Social Choice and Welfare.
Despite its prominent position amongst the major voting procedures, AV does in fact not fit particularly neatly into the standard model of voting used in social choice theory. In this model, each * Part of this work has been presented at the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK) in Brussels in June 2007 (Endriss, 2007) , the Social Choice Colloquium at the University of Tilburg in September 2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar on Computational Issues in Social Choice in October 2007, as well as local seminars at the Universities of Amsterdam, Padova, and Paris-Dauphine. The insightful feedback received from the participants of these meetings is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are also due to Steve Brams for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
voter is assumed to have a ranking of the candidates representing her preferences; and voters vote by reporting such a ranking (truthfully or otherwise) to the election chair. AV does not fit this model, because in AV a ballot is a subset of the set of candidates rather than a ranking of those candidates. It is impossible to encode the information required to recover a ranking from a ballot using the balloting language of AV.
1 This has important consequences. A central question in voting theory is under what circumstances we can design voting mechanisms that are strategy-proof, i.e., that will never give a voter an incentive to not vote truthfully (Barberà, 2001; Taylor, 2005; Gaertner, 2006) . But this is not a meaningful question for AV: if we cannot fully express our preferences, we can certainly not be expected to do so truthfully. There are two aspects to strategy-proof voting that we may find attractive. First, we can expect to get an outcome that is an honest reflection of the "will of the people", because no voter has an incentive to report insincere preferences. Second, voters do not have to strategise over how to vote, because truthful voting provides them with a dominant strategy.
2 It has been argued that AV does not fare particularly well with respect to the second criterion. As pointed out by Niemi (1984) , a feature of AV that may be considered problematic is that even if a voter wants to be sincere, AV does not prescribe a clear course of action (because, as we shall see, in AV there is no unique way of voting sincerely). This is usually considered a negative feature of a voting procedure, although the perceived view on this matter has recently come under attack by Dowding and van Hees (2008) , who have argued that sophisticated voting and reflection on the preferences of the other members of society may in fact be a good thing. In this paper, we shall instead be interested in the first criterion: the extent to which a voting procedure promotes sincere expressions of preference. In AV, a ballot is called sincere if the voter in question prefers each of the approved candidates to each of the disapproved candidates (Brams and Fishburn, 2007) .
3 The question we seek to answer in this paper is this: Are there reasonable assumptions under which no voter will ever have an incentive to manipulate an AV election by entering an insincere ballot?
We shall consider two types of assumptions. The first concerns restrictions to the number of candidates running for election. As is well known, if there are only two candidates, then neither strategising nor insincere voting will be a worry for any reasonable voting procedure. We shall instead analyse elections with three or four candidates in some detail.
The second type of assumption concerns the voters' preferences over sets of candidates. When there is more than one candidate with a maximal number of approvals, then AV produces a set of tied winners, from which one candidate should be selected using a suitable tie-breaking rule. Therefore, a voter considering to manipulate an election will have to reason over alternative sets of winning candidates and her chosen strategy will depend on her preferences over such sets. The assumptions we shall work with concern the principles by which a voter will extend her preferences over individual 1 There is a simple information-theoretic argument for this claim: In an election with n candidates, there are 2 n distinct ballots a voter may submit under AV. On the other hand, assuming that preferences are total orders over candidates, a voter may have any of n! distinct preferences (and even more if preferences are taken to be weak orders). Hence, as n! > 2 n for any n > 3, the AV balloting language is simply not rich enough to represent all possible preferences.
2 Indeed, rather than defining strategy-proofness in terms of the absence of incentives to not vote truthfully, we can also use this aspect as the basis for a definition. For instance, to be able to accommodate both ranked voting methods and AV, Brams and Fishburn (2002, Definition 6 .7) choose this route and define strategy-proofness as the property of every voter having a unique dominant strategy, given her preference.
3 That is, any given preference order will give rise to multiple sincere ballots to choose from.
candidates to a preference order over (nonempty) sets of candidates. This is a well-studied problem in social choice theory (see e.g. Barberà et al., 2004; Gärdenfors, 1976; Kelly, 1977; Kannai and Peleg, 1984; Nitzan and Pattanaik, 1984; Puppe, 1995; Can et al., 2009; Erdamar and Sanver, 2008) and we shall be examining incentives to vote sincerely under AV for a range of different such principles proposed in the literature.
Paper overview. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our model, which involves defining the approval voting procedure and the notion of sincerity, and we state the question we shall address in this paper in more detail. A central aspect of the model concerns the assumptions made on how voter preferences over individual candidates extend to preferences over sets of candidates. Section 3 reviews a range of axioms proposed in the literature for modelling this problem. Section 4 and 5 then present our results on the absence of incentives to vote insincerely under approval voting for different sets of assumptions on how preferences are extended to set preferences. In Section 4 we focus on very weak assumptions and are able to derive positive results for elections with a small number of candidates, in particular elections with three or four candidates. In Section 5 we focus on somewhat stronger assumptions and are able to obtain similar such results, this time without any restrictions on the number of candidates. Section 6 reviews related work (Brams and Fishburn, 1978; de Sinopoli et al., 2006; Laslier, 2009; Endriss et al., 2009; Merrill and Nagel, 1987; Peters et al., 2008; Dowding and van Hees, 2008) and in Section 7 we summarise our results and conclude.
The Model
In this section we define our model and state the main problem we shall address. (An important detail of the model, namely how voters extend their preferences over individual candidates to sets of candidates, will largely be relegated to Section 3.)
Preferences
Recall that a preorder is a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive; a weak order is a preorder that is complete; and a total order is a weak order that is antisymmetric (Roberts, 1979) . Throughout this paper, let C be a finite set of two or more candidates and let n = |C| denote the number of candidates. Let C = 2 C \{∅} denote the set of nonempty sets of candidates.
Each of a finite set of voters (their exact number will be of no concern to us) have preferences over both individual candidates and nonempty sets of candidates.
• As for preferences over individual candidates, we assume that these are total orders: every voter is equipped with a total preference order˙ defined over C. That is, we write a˙ b to express that the voter in question likes candidate a at least as much as candidate b. The corresponding strict preference relation is denoted by>; that is, we write a> b if a˙ b but not b˙ a.
• As for preferences over nonempty sets of candidates, we assume that these are weak orders: every voter is equipped with a weak preference order defined over C. That is, it may be the case that a voter will be indifferent between two alternative sets (but she will never be indifferent between two alternative individuals).
5 We write A B if A B but not B A (strict preference); and we write A ∼ B if both A B and B A (indifference).
Of course, a voter's will not be entirely independent of her˙ , but we assume that we do not know how to derive from˙ (besides also not knowing˙ itself). For example, even if we do know that a> b> c, then this will usually not provide us with any hints regarding the relative ranking of {a, c} versus {b} in terms of . This issue will be discussed in detail in Section 3.
Later, we will require some notation to conveniently refer to the best and the worst candidates from a given set. For any set A ∈ C, we write max(A) for the (unique) maximal element in A, i.e., for that a ∈ A for which a˙ b for all b ∈ A (with˙ always clear from the context). Similarly, we write min(A) for the (unique) minimal element in A. (Uniqueness follows from our assumption thaṫ is a total rather than just a weak order.) Beyond their preference orders, we can imagine a certain type of voter also having a utility (or valuation) function u : C → R that maps individual candidates to numerical values. Such a utility function induces a preference order˙ , namely: a˙ b if and only if u(a) ≥ u(b). But note that without additional assumptions on the tie-breaking rule, u does not induce a complete weak order on sets. If we also make assumptions regarding the tie-breaking rule, and if we assume that voters will vote so as to maximise their expected utility, then we speak of expected-utility maximisers. This is a common assumption made in the literature. For instance, Myerson and Weber (1993) , in their analysis of voting equilibria, assume that voters are expected-utility maximisers (see also Can et al., 2009 ). We will return to this issue in a comment in Section 3.2 and, in particular, in Section 3.6. We stress that for much of this paper we do not make this assumption (the only result based on this assumption is Theorem 10).
Approval Voting
The system of approval voting (AV) consists of a method for balloting voters and a method for tallying the ballots received to determine the winner(s) of the election (Brams and Fishburn, 2007; Merrill and Nagel, 1987) . A ballot B ⊆ C is a subset of the set of candidates. Each voter has to submit one such ballot. A candidate is a winner if he is included in at least as many ballots as any other candidate (that is, there can be more than one winner). The outcome of an election is the set of winners.
Submitting a ballot approving of either no or all candidates amounts to abstaining. We do allow voters to abstain by submitting such an abstention ballot. A proper ballot is a ballot that is not an abstention ballot.
5 These assumptions are in line with large parts of the literature (see e.g. Barberà et al., 2004) , but generalisations and variations are of course possible. We will briefly comment the consequences of taking to be a preorder in Section 6 and on letting˙ be a weak order in Section 7.
Simplified Notation for Ballots and Outcomes
Next, for the purpose of aiding with the presentation of examples, we introduce some simplified notation for writing ballots and election outcomes, from the perspective of a particular voter with a particular preference order˙ . (Recall that both ballots and outcomes are subsets of C.)
The notation is best explained by means of a concrete example. Suppose there are 5 candidates. To denote the ballot that approves of the two top candidates and the bottom candidate according to our voter's preferences, we write [11001] . To denote outcomes, we use curly brackets rather than square brackets. For instance, {01000} is the election outcome in which our voter's second favourite candidate is the sole winner.
Sincerity and Manipulation
Given a voter's preference order˙ , a ballot B ⊆ C is called sincere if the voter really does prefer each approved candidate to each disapproved candidate; that is, if a˙ b for all a ∈ B and all b ∈ C \B. This is the standard notion of sincerity in AV as defined by Brams and Fishburn (2007, p. 29) . We will comment on alternative views on the matter in Section 6. Observe that according to this definition, abstention ballots are considered sincere.
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As discussed in the introduction, the main question we seek to answer is this: Are there reasonable assumptions under which no voter will ever have an incentive to manipulate an AV election by entering an insincere ballot? Specifically, we shall analyse the following kind of situation. Suppose a voter knows how all other voters are going to vote and is considering which ballot to submit. Whether or not that ballot will be considered sincere depends on her true preference order˙ . On the other hand, how satisfied she will be with the set of winning candidates depends on her set preferences given by . She will have an incentive to vote insincerely if there exists an outcome she can achieve by means of an insincere ballot that (strictly) dominates (according to ) all outcomes she can achieve by means of voting sincerely. Vice versa, if for every ballot (including every insincere ballot) there exists some sincere ballot that weakly dominates the former, then our voter has no incentive to vote insincerely. We want to identify assumptions under which this is the case. We shall consider two types of assumptions. The first concerns the number of candidates. As is well-known, for n = 2 candidates, the answer to our question is yes. Approval voting, like any other reasonable voting procedure, is unproblematic in view of manipulation for two-candidate elections. Results such as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and its generalisations (see e.g. Taylor, 2005) point at difficulties for elections with three or more candidates only. In Section 4, we will specifically look into elections with three or four candidates. The second type of assumption (the one we shall largely focus on) concerns the relationship between˙ and , and thereby the relationship between sincerity of a ballot and satisfaction with the resulting outcome. These assumptions will be introduced in Section 3; results regarding the absence of incentives to vote insincerely under different such assumptions are spread over Sections 4 and 5. Note that our model presupposes that all voters will play pure strategies (every ballot corresponds to a strategy, and we will use the two terms interchangeably). We shall briefly comment on alternative models in Section 6. We conclude this section by introducing some terminology required for analysing the strategies available to a manipulator. Suppose our would-be manipulator knows how all other voters are going to vote. Given those votes, we count the points obtained by each candidate. One or more of them will have received the highest number of approvals; we call them the pivotal candidates. Some will have received exactly one point less than the pivotal candidates; we call them the subpivotal candidates. We call the remaining candidates insignificant. Insignificant candidates have no chance of being elected, whatever ballot our manipulator chooses to submit. She can either cause a subset of the pivotal candidates or the union of all pivotal candidates together with a subset of the subpivotal candidates to be elected.
Preferences over Sets of Candidates
A voter's a total preference order˙ , declared over the set of candidates C, is not sufficient to fully describe her preferences over election outcomes, which are nonempty sets of candidates. We therefore need to choose a suitable set of assumptions that govern how a voter's preference order˙ over individual candidates are to be lifted to a preference relation over sets of candidates. This is a problem that has been studied extensively in social choice theory. Barberà et al. (2004) give an excellent overview of the most important principles for extending preferences defined on a set to its powerset that have been proposed in the literature.
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Recall that˙ is a total order on C, and is a weak order on C. We shall define a number of axioms that express properties of , formulated in terms of both˙ and , that we (as mechanism designers) know about. We do not know the actual weak order , but we do know some of its properties, which allows us to narrow down the space of possible choices for . We assume that we are cautious in the sense that we will consider it possible that for the pairs of nonempty sets for which the relative ranking is not fixed by our axioms, the actual ranking may be the worst possible ranking in terms of encouraging insincere voting.
8 That is, from a technical point of view, we may also think of as the smallest preorder generated by our axioms of choice. We will say that for a voter who knows all other ballots and whose set preferences are constrained by a certain set of axioms it is the case that any strategy (in particular any strategy that is insincere) is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy, if that sincere strategy weakly dominates the former strategy according to that smallest preorder . We now go through a list of axioms and principles that have been put forward in the literature. To clarify the differences between different sets of assumptions, we prove a series of lemmas along the way, showing which sets of axioms do or do not entail each other. The notion of entailment is made precise in Section 3.2 and the notion of satisfaction of an axiom, on which the former relies, is spelt out in Section 3.1.
7 Barberà et al. (2004) distinguish three types of scenarios: (1) the elements of the set are interpreted as as possible outcomes after some randomised choice; (2) the elements of the set represent opportunities and the decision maker in question can choose one of them; or (3) the sets themselves are the final outcomes. The kind of principles that are relevant for us mostly fall under type (1); although a case can be made that some of of the principles belonging to type (2) are also of interest (for instance, if a voter is overly optimistic and will act as if she were able to choose her favourite winner from amongst a set of front-runners).
8 We shall comment on a different, more optimistic, perspective in Section 6.
Kelly Principle: No Information
A fundamental property that any reasonable choice of set preferences will satisfy is the extension axiom, which expresses that when a voter compares two singleton sets, her set preferences will directly correspond to her preferences over individuals.
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(EXT) {a} {b} if a> b
Observe that, due to the fact that must be a weak order, (EXT) is equivalent to saying that {a} {b} if and only if a˙ b. Formally, axioms such as this are properties of triples (C,˙ , ) of a set of candidates C, a total order˙ over those candidates, and a weak order over nonempty sets of candidates. We say that (C,˙ , ) satisfies an axiom such as (EXT) if the conditions specified in the axiom hold for that set of candidates and that choice of relations. To simplify presentation, we will also often say that a weak order satisfies an axiom, taking C and˙ as fixed.
Besides (EXT), there are two further assumptions that we can safely make without any knowledge of the tie-breaking rule or the voter's attitude towards risk:
The former expresses that the voter never prefers a set over (the singleton consisting just of) the best element in that set; the latter says that she weakly prefers a set over the worst element in that set. By accepting all of (EXT), (MAX), and (MIN) together, we can express that A should be weakly preferred to B if all elements of A are weakly preferred to all elements of B and that A should be strictly preferred to B if all elements of A are strictly preferred to all elements of B. In reference to the work of Kelly (1977) , Can et al. (2009) call this the Kelly Principle-a choice of terminology that we shall adopt here as well. We shall often write (KEL) as a shorthand for the conjunction of (EXT), (MAX), and (MIN). All other approaches for lifting preferences discussed in the sequel will be refinements of the Kelly Principle. If we accept the Kelly Principle, we can show that voting by means of a proper sincere ballot always weakly dominates abstaining. Hence, whether or not we allow abstention and whether or not we consider abstaining sincere will in fact be irrelevant for our results on insincere manipulation. Lemma 1 For any voter whose preferences satisfy (KEL) and who knows all other ballots, abstaining is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy that does not amount to abstaining.
Proof. If our voter abstains, then the set of pivotal candidates will become the winners. The Gärdenfors Principle states that you should prefer set A over set B if you can obtain B from A by means of a sequence of operations that involve either removing the most preferred element of the set or adding a new element that is less preferred than those already in the set (Gärdenfors, 1976) . Our statement of the Gärdenfors axioms follows Barberà et al. (2004) .
We shall write (GAR) for the conjunction of (GF1) and (GF2). The Gärdenfors Principle is strictly stronger (more restrictive) than the Kelly Principle. We state this well-known fact as a lemma.
In the statement of that lemma and throughout the remainder of this paper, we say that a set of axioms Γ entails another set of axioms ∆, if for any triple (C,˙ , ) of a set of candidates C, a total order˙ on C, and a weak order on the corresponding C, it is the case that, if (C,˙ , ) satisfies all of the axioms in Γ, then it will also satisfy all of the axioms in ∆.
Lemma 2 (GAR) entails (KEL), but not vice versa.
Proof. We need to show how to derive (EXT), (MAX), and (MIN) from (GF1) and (GF2). First, to derive (EXT), suppose a> b. Then {a} {a, b} by (GF2) and {a, b} {b} by (GF1); thus {a} {b} by transitivity, proving (EXT). Next, we show how to derive (MAX). For singleton sets A, we vacuously have {max(A)} ∼ A. For all other cases, let A = {a 1 , . . . , a k } with k ≥ 2 and suppose a 1> a 2> · · ·> a k . Then {a 1 } {a 1 , a 2 } by (GF2); and by the same kind of argument we also obtain {a 1 , a 2 } {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }, . . . , {a 1 , . . . , a k−1 } {a 1 , . . . , a k−1 , a k }. Putting them all together yields {a 1 } {a 1 , . . . , a k }, i.e., {max(A)} A. Hence, in all cases we have {max(A)} A. Finally, (MIN) can be derived in the same manner, by iterating (GF1).
To show that (KEL) does not entail (GAR), it suffices to observe that {110} {111} is forced by the Gärdenfors Principle, but not by the Kelly Principle. 2
Ching and Zhou (2002, Lemma 1) show that adopting the Gärdenfors Principle is equivalent to assuming that voters are expected-utility maximisers who believe that a "proportional" tie-breaking rule will be used (see also Can et al., 2009) . 11 A proportional tie-breaking rule is a rule that associates a positive weight w x ∈ R + with each candidate x ∈ C, and for a set of candidates A ∈ C and a candidate a ∈ A selects a with probability wa P x∈A wx . If we do not know the weights and if we do not know the voter's utility function (but we do know that she is an expected-utility maximiser and we do know her˙ ), then all we can predict is that our voter will prefer a set when a better candidate has been added or the worst has been removed (which exactly corresponds to the Gärdenfors axioms).
11 Ching and Zhou (2002) call this "Bayesian rationality"; call it "conditional expected utility consistency"; and Can et al. (2009) call it "Bayesian expected utility consistency".
An alternative interpretation of the Gärdenfors Principle is the following. Suppose the election chair will be charged with breaking any ties and our voter believes that he will do so rationally in the sense that there exists a total order over C (representing the chair's preferences) and the chair will select from any set A the unique element that is maximal with respect to that total order. The voter has certain beliefs as to which total order the chair will use, but we, the mechanism designers, do not know what these beliefs are. If we furthermore assume that the voter is an expected-utility maximiser, then this induces a particular preorder . Erdamar and Sanver (2008, Theorem 3.4) show that this is the same as the one generated by the Gärdenfors Principle. This, arguably, is a fairly realistic scenario, which further underlines the importance of the Gärdenfors Principle.
The assumptions made by Brams and Fishburn (2007, p. 18) in their discussion of set preferences, "Assumption P" and "Assumption R", are also equivalent to the Gärdenfors Principle.
Kannai-Peleg Principle: Independence and Max-Min Preferences
Another important principle is represented by the independence axiom of Kannai and Peleg (1984) :
This axiom expresses the intuitively appealing idea that adding the same additional candidate to each of two sets should not reverse a voter's preferences over those two sets. Kannai and Peleg prove a lemma that shows that if (IND) holds on top of the Gärdenfors Principle, then any set A is equally preferred as the set {max(A), min(A)} consisting only of the best and the worst element in A. This latter property corresponds to the following axiom.
is satisfied, then this means that any judgements regarding set preferences can be made by only comparing the maxima and minima of sets. To illustrate the link between (IND) and (MMX), we give here the simple proof of Kannai and Peleg's lemma.
Lemma 3 (GAR) and (IND) entail (MMX).
Proof. Assuming the Gärdenfors Principle and independence, we need to show that A ∼ {max(A), min(A)} for any nonempty set A. This is vacuously true if |A| ≤ 2, so let A be any set of candidates with |A| > 2. We get {max(A)} A \{min(A)} by repeated application of (GF2), and thus {max(A), min(A)} A by (IND). Similarly, we get A \{max(A)} {min(A)} by repeated application of (GF1), and thus
The converse is not true, i.e., (MMX) is a weaker axiom than (IND). For instance, in the smallest preorder satisfying (GAR) and (MMX) we have {010} {001} but not {110} {101}, which means that (IND) is not satisfied.
The main theorem of Kannai and Peleg (1984) shows that for |C| ≥ 6 there can be no weak order that is consistent with both (GAR) and (IND). This suggests that, despite its intuitive appeal, the independence axiom is too restrictive to model set preferences. (MMX) is weaker and Kannai and Peleg's impossibility does not persist if we use that axiom instead.
12 We shall refer to the conjunction of (GAR) and (MMX) as the Kannai-Peleg Principle. Several proposals in the literature for extending preferences on a set to its powerset are refinements of (what we call) the Kannai-Peleg Principle, i.e., several of these principles can be formulated in terms of the maxima and the minima of the sets to be compared (Barberà et al., 2004) .
3.4 Sen-Puppe Principle: Pairwise Dominance and Single Flips Sen (1991) suggests an axiom whereby A should be weakly preferred to B, if the two sets have the same cardinality and there exists a surjective mapping f : A → B such that a˙ f (a) for all a ∈ A. Puppe (1995) points out that this is equivalent to the following simpler axiom, which we shall refer to as the single-flip axiom.
(SIF) (A \{a}) ∪ {b} A if b> a for a ∈ A and b ∈ A These principles have originally been proposed in the context of formalising freedom of choice (Sen, 1991; Puppe, 1995) , but considering that (SIF) is actually a weakening of both (IND) and (MMX), it is arguably also of interest for our purposes.
Lemma 4 (GAR) and (MMX) entail (SIF).
Proof. Suppose (GAR) and (MMX) hold. Take any set A and any candidates a and b such that b> a, a ∈ A, and b ∈ A. We can distinguish several cases, depending on the position of a and b with respect to min(A) and max(A). For instance, if b> max(A) and max(A)> a> min(A), then (A \{a}) ∪ {b} ∼ {b, max(A), min(A)} by (MMX). As we also have A ∼ {max(A), min(A)} by (MMX) and {b, max(A), min(A)} {max(A), min(A)} by (GF1), the required (A \{a}) ∪ {b} A follows by transitivity. The remaining cases are checked in the same manner.
2
To see that (MMX) is stronger than (SIF), observe that outcomes {101} and {111} are equally preferred under (MMX), but incomparable under (SIF), even when combined with the Gärdenfors Principle. We shall refer to the conjunction of (GAR) and (SIF) as the Sen-Puppe Principle.
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3.5 Nitzan-Pattanaik Principle: Median-Based Preferences Nitzan and Pattanaik (1984) suggest to rank alternative sets on the basis of their medians. The median of an odd-numbered set of candidates A is the candidate a ∈ A such that the number of elements in A that are preferred to a is equal to the number of elements in A that are considered inferior to a. For even-numbered sets, there are two median elements. Formally, we define the median of a set A ∈ C as the subset med(A) = {a ∈ A | #{b ∈ A | b˙ a} − #{b ∈ A} | a˙ b} ∈ {0, 1, −1}}, which always has either one or two elements, and use this definition to formulate the following axiom:
We call the conjunction of (GAR) and (MED) the Nitzan-Pattanaik Principle. That is, under this principle, sets are compared by comparing their medians using the Gärdenfors Principle.
Uniform Tie-Breaking with Expected-Utility Maximisers
Arguably the most natural choice for a tie-breaking mechanism is the uniform tie-breaking rule, where each of the front-runners is selected as the election winner with equal probability. Assuming that the uniform tie-breaking rule is used together with the assumption that voters are expected-utility maximisers yields a very attractive framework in which to analyse voters' preferences over sets of candidates. While these assumptions have been axiomatised in the literature (see e.g. Fishburn, 1972; Can et al., 2009) , for our purposes here we shall find it more convenient to give a direct definition. Take a set of candidates C and a voter whose preferences are represented by a total order˙ on C and a weak order on C. Then we say that this voter satisfies the assumption of being an expectedutility maximiser under uniform tie-breaking, if there exists a utility function u : C → R such that (i) u represents˙ , i.e., for all a, b ∈ C we have u(a) ≥ u(b) if and only if a˙ b; and (ii) for all A, B ∈ C we have A B whenever the following condition holds:
As we shall see next, these assumptions entail the Sen-Puppe Principle.
Lemma 5 Under uniform tie-breaking, the set preferences of any voter who is an expected-utility maximiser will satisfy (GAR) and (SIF).
Proof. Immediate. 2
The converse is not true. For instance, no expected-utility maximiser expecting ties to be broken uniformly will ever rank {111} strictly above both {010} and {101}, 14 but this kind of inference would not be sanctioned by the Sen-Puppe Principle alone.
Optimism and Pessimism
Adopting the terminology of Taylor (2005), we say that a voter is optimistic if she prefers set A over set B whenever she prefers the best element in A over the best element in B. We use the following axiom to express optimism:
We say that a voter is an optimist if she conforms to (OPT) on top of the Kelly Principle. 15 A voter who believes that the person charged with breaking ties shares her own preferences is one example for someone who will have optimistic set preferences. Also, if a randomised tie-breaking rule, such as the uniform tie-breaking rule, is used and a voter is an expected-utility maximiser with a very skewed utility function, giving much higher utility to a than to b whenever a> b, then that voter will have set preferences that satisfy (OPT).
14 To see this, consider the following three cases: the average utility of the best and the worst candidate is either
(1) higher than, (2) lower than, or (3) equal to the utility of the middle candidate (and there are no other cases). In the first case {101} {111}; in the second case {010} {111}; and in the third case {111} ∼ {010}. 15 Equivalently, we may say that an optimist is a voter conforming to (EXT) and (OPT), because (MAX) and (MIN) are entailed by (EXT) and (OPT). z z t t t t t 6 6 t t t t t 6 6 t t t t t
6 6 t t t t t z z t t t t t z z t t t t t 6 6 t t t t t A voter may also be pessimistic and judge sets of candidates in terms of the worst candidates in those sets. A pessimist is a voter that conforms to (KEL) and the following axiom:
Pessimism may be an appropriate assumption when we are modelling a voter who believes that the person entrusted with breaking ties has preferences that are diametrically opposed to her own.
Observe that optimism, characterised by axiom (OPT), and pessimism, characterised by axiom (PES), are the only principles we have presented in this section that directly induce (complete) weak orders. For all other sets of assumptions, the smallest induced relations are merely preorders (which are assumed to be consistent with the actual weak orders of the voters). Figure 1 illustrates the various principles discussed (except for optimism and pessimism), for the special case of three candidates. For each set of assumptions the smallest preorder generated by those assumptions is shown. Amongst other things, we can see that the preorder induced by assuming uniform tie-breaking with expected-utility maximisers is the same as the preorder induced by the Sen-Puppe Principle for three candidates (but they differ for ≥ 4 candidates; and even for three candidates, as shown in the example at the end of Section 3.6, we can draw additional inferences under uniform tie-breaking with expected utility maximisers).
Comparison

Results for Elections with Few Candidates
We are interested in identifying assumptions under which AV can be shown to never incentivise voters to vote insincerely. In this section we establish several positive results of this sort for elections with small numbers of candidates (in particular, three candidates) under very weak assumptions on how voters extend their preferences to preferences over sets of candidates (such as the Gärdenfors Principle). We also identify borderline cases where insincere manipulation is possible, but where a minimal refinement on the assumptions made on preference extension can again lead to positive results. In our proofs, we employ computers to automatically check large numbers of simple cases.
In this section, we analyse voters that conform to either the Kelly Principle, the Gärdenfors Principle, or the Sen-Puppe Principle. For the other types of principles introduced in Section 3 we will be able to derive stronger results in Section 5.
An Example for Insincere Manipulation
Let us first give an example in which manipulation by means of an insincere ballot is possible. Suppose in an election with four candidates, one voter knows how everybody else is going to vote and is considering to manipulate. Counting the ballots of the other voters, suppose our would-be manipulator's first choice has received 9 approvals, her second choice 10 approvals, her third choice 9 approvals, and her least favourite candidate 10 approvals (note that the number of voters is irrelevant!). Using her own vote, she can now force a number of different election outcomes (before tie-breaking):
• Get outcome {1101} by voting with ballot [1000]. • Get outcome {0111} by voting with ballot [0010].
All other outcomes are unattainable to her. Now, suppose our would-be manipulator satisfies the Gärdenfors Principle. Then some of the attainable outcomes will clearly not be attractive to her. For instance, {0111} is dominated by {0100}. In other words, she has certainly no incentive to vote by means of the (insincere) ballot [0010] . Outcomes {0101} and {0001} are also dominated.
However, the Gärdenfors Principle is not sufficiently strong to tell us which of {1101}, {0100}, and {1111} is the most preferred for our would-be manipulator. If it is {1101}, then we are in safe waters, because the ballot to get that outcome is sincere. If it is {0100}, then there is no problem either, because she can achieve this outcome by voting sincerely, e.g., using [1100] . But if {1111} happens to be the strictly most preferred outcome of the three, then our manipulator does have an incentive to vote insincerely. Hence, for elections with four candidates and assuming only the Gärdenfors Principle, insincere manipulation is possible under AV. This is exactly what we would expect, given the multitude of negative results on social choice with more than two alternatives.
The Case of Three Candidates
Let us now analyse the case of three candidates systematically. Suppose a would-be manipulator knows how all other voters are going to vote. Given those votes, recall that we can distinguish pivotal, subpivotal, and insignificant candidates. By definition, at least one of the three candidates must be pivotal. If we consider all possible combinations of types of candidates, we can see that there are 3 3 − 2 3 = 19 different situations (also called contingencies in the literature) to distinguish (choosing one of three types for each of the three candidates, but excluding those combinations where no candidate is pivotal). Each of the rows in Table 1 corresponds to one such situation. Row (12) with label S.P.I, for example, represents the situation where our manipulator's favourite candidate is subpivotal, her second choice is pivotal, and her last choice is insignificant. The columns of Table 1 correspond to the valid ballots available to her. As Lemma 1 has established that abstention ballots are always weakly dominated by some other sincere ballot, we only include proper ballots here. The two sincere ballots are shown on the left; the four insincere ballots are shown on the right. The table cells correspond to the election outcomes for a given situation and a given final ballot. For example, if our manipulator chooses the sincere ballot [110] in situation S.P.I, then outcome {010} will be realised, i.e., the manipulator's second favourite candidate will be the sole winner. We emphasise that Table 1 covers every possible scenario that we need to consider.
The manipulator knows in which situation we are and needs to choose a ballot. She does so by choosing (one of) the best outcome(s) attainable to her in the situation at hand. Depending on our assumptions on set preferences, we can exclude some possible choices. Suppose all we know is that the manipulator satisfies the Kelly Principle, the very weakest assumption on set preferences. In Table 1 , we have underlined all those outcomes that, according to the Kelly Principle, are not strictly dominated by any other outcome in the same row. This shows that in most situations our voter will have no incentive to vote insincerely. For example, in situation (12) the unique top outcome is {110} and that outcome is attainable by voting sincerely using [110] (besides being also attainable via one of the insincere ballots). In fact, maybe rather surprisingly, there are only two critical situations where this is not the case. These are situations (11) and (13). In situation (11) it is conceivable that our voter's most preferred outcome is {111} (and not {110}), in which case she would have an incentive to vote insincerely using the ballot [101] . In situation (13), it is conceivable that her most preferred outcome is {011} (and neither {101} nor {111}), in which case she might vote using [010] .
The following two "plain axioms" are directly derived from rows (11) and (13). They represent the minimal additional assumptions we need to make, above and beyond the Kelly Principle, if we want to rule out any incentives for our voter to vote insincerely. For example, (AX2) excludes the possibility that {011} (corresponding to {b, c} in the statement of the axiom) be strictly preferred to both {101} and {111}. Hence, in situation (13), one of the two sincere outcomes that are undominated according to the Kelly Principle will be most preferred amongst all feasible outcomes. To summarise our observations, inspection of (1) P.P.P {100} {110} {001} {010} {011} {101} (2) P.P.S {100} {110} {111} {010} {010} {100} (3) P.P.I {100} {110} {110} {010} {010} {100} (4) P.S.P {100} {100} {001} {111} {001} {101} (5) P.S.S {100} {100} {101} {110} {111} {100} (6) P.S.I {100} {100} {100} {110} {110} {100} (7) P.I.P {100} {100} {001} {101} {001} {101} (8) P.I.S {100} {100} {101} {100} {101} {100} (9) P.I.I {100} {100} {100} {100} {100} {100} (10) S.P.P {111} {010} {001} {010} {011} {001} (11) S.P.S {110} {010} {011} {010} {010} {111} (12) S.P.I {110} {010} {010} {010} {010} {110} (13) S.S.P {101} {111} {001} {011} {001} {001} (14) S.I.P {101} {101} {001} {001} {001} {001} (15) I.P.P {011} {010} {001} {010} {011} {001} (16) I.P.S {010} {010} {011} {010} {010} {011} (17) I.P.I {010} {010} {010} {010} {010} {010} (18) I.S.P {001} {011} {001} {011} {001} {001} (19) I.I.P {001} {001} {001} {001} {001} {001} Table 1 : Outcomes for each possible situation and ballot, for elections with three candidates. Outcomes that are not strictly dominated according to the Kelly Principle by another possible outcome for the same situation are underlined. Insincere manipulation can occur in situations (11) and (13).
Theorem 1 Under AV with three candidates, any strategy available to a voter who knows all other ballots and whose preferences satisfy (KEL), (AX1), and (AX2) is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy.
That is, under the stated (very weak) assumptions on set preferences, no voter will ever have an incentive to vote by means of an insincere ballot when there are (at most) three candidates up for election. We get the same positive result for any other axiom system that entails the axioms referred to in Theorem 1 (for the special case of three candidates). In particular, under the Gärdenfors Principle no voter will ever have an incentive to vote insincerely in an election with only three candidates:
Theorem 2 Under AV with three candidates, any strategy available to a voter who knows all other ballots and whose preferences satisfy (GAR) is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy.
Proof. This is an immediate corollary of Theorem 1, because (GAR) entails all of (KEL), (AX1), and (AX2).
Theorem 2 is a known result. It immediately follows from Theorem 3 of Brams and Fishburn (1978) , whose assumptions on preference extension are equivalent to the Gärdenfors Principle. Given that (GAR) is not entailed by (KEL) together with (AX1) and (AX2), Theorem 1 is technically slightly stronger (albeit conceptually less appealing) than Theorem 2.
Recall that classical impossibility results in social choice theory, such as Arrow's Theorem or the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and its various generalisations, typically start to "bite" when we move from two to three alternatives (see e.g. Taylor, 2005) . Interestingly, in our setting this kind of transition only takes place when we move from three to four candidates: the example of Section 4.1 demonstrates that, under the Gärdenfors Principle, ruling out insincere manipulation is impossible in elections with four candidates, while Theorem 2 shows that it is possible to do so for elections with three candidates.
The Case of Four Candidates
If there are four candidates and voters conform to the Gärdenfors Principle, the example given in Section 4.1 shows that insincere voting can occur. Hence, as already observed by Brams and Fishburn (1978, Theorem 3 ), we will not be able to generalise Theorem 2 to the case of four candidates. Instead, in analogy to our analysis of the Kelly Principe for elections with three candidates, we now want to analyse how many scenarios there are where the Gärdenfors Principle cannot rule out manipulation with an insincere ballot. The problem, however, is that when there are more than three candidates it is not feasible anymore to write out and reliably check the kind of data shown in Table 1 we propose to generate and check this kind of data automatically. We first sketch an algorithm for doing this, and then present our results for elections with four candidates. Suppose we have fixed the number of candidates n and the set of assumptions we want to make regarding the extension of preferences to set preferences. Given n, we can generate all possible situations (contingencies) we need to consider: these can be represented by all lists of length n of the letters P, S, and I that include at least one copy of P each. We can also generate all possible proper ballots: these are all lists of length n of the numbers 0 and 1 that include at least one 0 and one 1 each. Those ballots that are lists in which all occurrences of 0 occur to the right of all occurrences of 1 are sincere; all others are insincere. Given any situation and any ballot, it is easy to compute the resulting outcome (the set of winning candidates). Furthermore, for any two outcomes A and A , we can check whether A is known to weakly dominate A according to the assumptions we have made regarding ; and we can also check whether A is known to strictly dominate A under these assumptions. (Depending on the axioms for we wish to accept, this last point may not be a trivial matter, but it is clear that it is possible in principle. How it can be achieved in practice for the groups of axioms we consider here will be explained in the Appendix.) Now, to systematically check whether a particular scenario admits a situation where a voter would have an incentive to vote insincerely and to generate all additional plain axioms that would be required to rule out any such scenario, we execute the algorithm described in Table 2 , once for every possible situation S. This algorithm will return a (possibly empty) list Γ of plain axioms (from which we can remove any duplicates). 16 We can distinguish three types of such output lists:
16 An alternative formulation for the axioms returned by the algorithm of Table 2 is this:
(1) Compute the set Ω of undominated sincere outcomes for S as follows:
(a) For each sincere (proper) ballot B, compute the outcome for S and B. Collect all thus computed outcomes in Ω (dropping any duplicates).
(b) Remove any element A from Ω for which there is another element A in Ω such that A is known to strictly dominate A.
Observe that this ensures that the best possible outcomes available to our voter by means of a sincere ballot will be elements of Ω, and Ω is the smallest set with this property that we can construct given our limited knowledge of the voter's set preferences.
(2) For every insincere ballot B: Compute the set Ω ⊆ Ω as the the set of all (sincere) outcomes A ∈ Ω such that A [S,B] is not known to strictly dominate A. (Note that Ω could be the empty set.)
Output the following plain axiom:
A A [S,B] for at least one A ∈ Ω (Observe that if Ω is the empty set, then this axiom cannot be satisfied.) Table 2 : Algorithm to compute the additional plain axioms required to exclude incentives for insincere voting for a given situation S.
(1) If the list Γ is empty, then this proves that our assumptions are sufficiently strong to guarantee the absence of incentives to vote insincerely for elections with n candidates.
(2) If Γ includes an unsatisfiable axiom (that is, an axiom with Ω = ∅), then this proves that our assumptions do allow for situations where a voter will have an incentive to vote insincerely in an election with n candidates. Furthermore, in this case it is impossible to rectify this problem by adding additional axioms (because one of the additional axioms required would contradict one of the strict preference relations already forced by our assumptions).
17
(3) Otherwise, that is, if Γ is not empty and does not include an unsatisfiable axiom of the above type, voters will sometimes have incentives to vote insincerely, but this problem can be rectified. We then have a proof that the original assumptions together with the axioms in Γ will guarantee that no voter ever has an incentive to vote insincerely in an election with n candidates.
Our algorithm presumes that we are able to check whether one given outcome A is known to weakly 17 For example, if we were to run the algorithm for n = 3 with the assumption that voters conform to the Kelly Principle and the additional axiom {111} {110}, then the output will be of this type, because the additional axiom directly contradicts (AX1), which we know is required to make elections with three candidates and Kelly voters sincere.
(or strongly) dominate another given outcome A . For the Kelly Principle, the Gärdenfors Principle, and the Sen-Puppe Principle, concrete algorithms for answering such a query are presented in the Appendix. We have implemented the full algorithm in the programming language Prolog (see e.g. Bratko, 2001) . 18 In the case of four candidates with voters conforming to the Gärdenfors Principle, it produces the following two plain axioms as output:
(AX3) {b} {a, b, c, d} or {a, b, d} {a, b, c, d} if a> b> c> d (AX4) {a, d} {a, c, d} or {a, b, d} {a, c, d} or {a, b, c, d} {a, c, d} if a> b> c> d
The contingency corresponding to (AX3) is P.S.P.S. This is the case familiar from the example of Section 4.1. The contingency corresponding to (AX4) is S.S.S.P. In this case, the insincere ballot
[1010] will produce the outcome {1011}, which the Gärdenfors Principle alone is not strong enough to show to be at least as preferred as the three outcomes attainable by means of sincere ballots. Provided our program is a correct implementation of the algorithm (on this point see Section 4.5 and the Appendix), we can infer the following result:
Theorem 3 Under AV with four candidates, any strategy available to a voter who knows all other ballots and whose preferences satisfy (GAR), (AX3), and (AX4) is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy.
That is, a minor refinement of the Gärdenfors Principle will rule out any incentives to vote insincerely for a voter who knows how the others are going to vote, even for elections with four candidates. Under the Sen-Puppe Principle the refinement required is even smaller:
Theorem 4 Under AV with four candidates, any strategy available to a voter who knows all other ballots and whose preferences satisfy (GAR), (SIF), and (AX3) is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy.
Proof. The second disjunct of (AX4) is an instance of (SIF), i.e., the latter entails the former. The claim then follows from Theorem 3. 2 (SIF), and certainly the much weaker (AX3), as well as (AX4) are all reasonable assumptions that will be justified in many practical cases. The Gärdenfors Principle itself is certainly widely accepted. That means, in practice, we will usually be able to exclude insincere manipulations from voters who have obtained full information of the contingency of an election with (up to) four candidates.
Overview of Quantitative Results
As we have seen, when the number of candidates is small, so are both the number of situations in which we must consider it possible that a voter may vote insincerely and the number of additional plain axioms that we would have to accept to be able to rule out insincere voting. Naturally, as we increase the number of candidates, the number of such "exceptions" will go up as well. To give an Number of candidates: |C| = 2 |C| = 3 |C| = 4 |C| = 5 |C| = 6 |C| = 7 figure) and number of additional plain axioms required to rule out insincere voting (bottom figure) , for different axiom systems and numbers of candidates.
impression of how much the number of exceptions grows, Table 3 provides an overview of the relevant figures for elections with 2-7 candidates for the three groups of axioms considered in this section. For each group of axioms and each election size, the corresponding table cell shows two figures. The one on top is the number of critical situations (specifying for each candidate whether he is pivotal, subpivotal, or insignificant) in which a voter may benefit from insincere manipulation, and the one at the bottom is the number of additional plain axioms required. 19 In no instance did our algorithm ever return an unsatisfiable axiom. That is, in all cases it is possible to amend the assumptions we started out with so as to rule out insincere manipulation, albeit in some cases a very large number of additional plain axioms will be required. For comparison, Table 3 also shows the overall number of situations for each election size (which is 3 |C| − 2 |C| ). As we can see, as |C| grows, not only does the absolute number of critical situations increase, but the same is true for the ratio of critical situations over situations in general. This is kind of quantitative data is interesting, but should not be over-interpreted. Conclusions drawn on the basis of such figures risk of suffering from the same drawbacks as, say, predictions regarding the likelihood of Condorcet cycles in a population, when those predictions rely on the "anonymous culture assumption" (Regenwetter et al., 2006) .
A Note on Methodology
Our approach of establishing results on the manipulability of a voting procedure using computer support may raise some questions. Before addressing these, for the benefit of the casual reader, it may be worth stressing that our approach has nothing to do with computer simulations. Computer simulations are very useful tools in computational economics, and have for instance been used to obtain data on the frequency of Condorcet cycles in aggregated preferences (see e.g. Regenwetter et al., 2006) , which is relevant to the frequency of manipulability of voting procedures. Our approach is entirely different: we merely use a computer to conveniently check a large number of cases in an analytic proof. The derived theorems are analytic results, not trends of the kind that can be revealed by means of a simulation. Now, one may wonder how reliable such an automatically derived proof is. Checking a proof here
19 That is, for some critical situations more than one plain axiom will be required.
means checking the program that has been used to carry out the derivation, in the same way in which checking a "classical" proof means verifying the mathematics involved line by line. In our case, the program used to generate all of the results reported in this section only consists of around 80 lines of code in the programming language Prolog (see e.g. Bratko, 2001 ). This means that anyone can reproduce the results and verify that the algorithm has been implemented correctly, in the same manner as they would check a standard proof. The correctness of the implemented algorithm ensures the correctness of our results in so far as we can trust that the system charged with executing our program (i.e., the concrete realisation of our programming language of choice on a computer) will work correctly according to specification. Such a guarantee cannot be given in general, but for a simple Prolog program using only the most basic features of the language it arguably can. Prolog is the main representative of the logic programming languages, it is directly based on first-order logic, and endowed with a fully specified and unambiguous semantics. There are many alternative implementations available, each of which has been tested over many years by thousands of (often expert) users. This does not exclude the possibility of an error, but it makes it much less likely than, say, the possibility that an error in a mathematical proof has been overlooked by the small number of experts who had the opportunity to check it.
That is, when an expert successfully checks our program, then this should afford us the same degree of confidence regarding the correctness of the results reported in this section as when an expert successfully checks the proofs in the remainder of this paper (which do not make use of any computer support). Provided we can give a sufficiently simple program in a sufficiently reliable programming language to carry out the case analysis required by a proof, this represents a valid method for obtaining theoretical results in social choice theory.
Results for General Elections
In this section we derive further results identifying assumptions under which AV will never give a voter an incentive to manipulate an election by submitting an insincere ballot. We now consider stronger assumptions on how voters extend their preferences to sets of candidates (such as uniform tie-breaking for expected-utility maximisers), which will permit us to state results that apply without restrictions on the number of candidates running in an election.
Preliminaries
Suppose a voter knows how everybody else is going to vote and is considering to manipulate. We want to show that, under certain assumptions on her set preferences, for any (possibly insincere) ballot available to her there exists a sincere ballot that weakly dominates the former. Recall that we can distinguish pivotal, subpivotal, and insignificant candidates. Our voter has the following options:
(1) Get a nonempty (and not necessarily proper) subset of the pivotal candidates elected, by approving that subset together with any number of subpivotal or insignificant candidates.
(2) Get all of the pivotal candidates and a (possibly empty and not necessarily proper) subset of the subpivotal candidates elected, by approving that subset together with any number of insignificant candidates.
We now show that any ballot of the first type will be weakly dominated by a sincere ballot, even under the very weakest of assumptions (namely, the Kelly Principle). Hence, for our results in the body of this section we will only have to deal with (possibly insincere) ballots of the second type.
Lemma 6 For any voter who knows all other ballots and whose preferences satisfy (KEL), any strategy that involves approving of a pivotal candidate is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy.
Proof. If our voter votes by approving of at least one pivotal candidate, then the outcome will be a subset of the set of pivotal candidates (scenario 1 above). Under the Kelly Principle, the outcome where her most preferred pivotal candidate is the sole winner weakly dominates all other such outcomes. So we only need to show that getting only the most preferred pivotal candidate elected is possible by means of a sincere ballot. But this is clearly the case: approving of that candidate and any candidates dominating him (all of which will be subpivotal or insignificant) will achieve this. 2
Optimism and Pessimism
The most restrictive kinds of assumptions on set preferences that we have discussed in Section 3 are optimism and pessimism. As we shall see next, if a voter is either optimistic or pessimistic, then she will never have an incentive to manipulate under AV by means of voting with an insincere ballot, independently of the number of candidates. In fact, these two results will turn out to be corollaries of our main theorem (Theorem 7). However, as it is possible to give direct proofs that are much simpler than the proof of the general result, we include these direct proofs here so as to better illustrate our approach.
Theorem 5 Under AV, any strategy available to a voter who knows all other ballots and whose preferences satisfy (KEL) and (OPT) is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy.
Proof. Lemma 6 applies; so what remains to be shown is that any strategy X that involves approving only of subpivotal and insignificant candidates (meaning that all pivotal and the approved subpivotal candidates win) is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy Y . We distinguish two cases:
• First, suppose the most preferred winner under strategy X is a pivotal candidate (call that candidate c). Then the sincere strategy of only approving of c and all candidates preferred to c (if any) will result in the outcome {c}, which by (MAX) weakly dominates the outcome for X.
• Second, if the most preferred winner under strategy X is a subpivotal candidate, then the sincere strategy of approving of the most preferred subpivotal candidate c and all insignificant candidates preferred to c (if any) will result in c and all pivotal candidates winning, which under (OPT) weakly dominates the outcome for X.
Hence, under no circumstances will our voter have an incentive to not submit a sincere ballot. 2
Theorem 6 Under AV, any strategy available to a voter who knows all other ballots and whose preferences satisfy (KEL) and (PES) is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy.
Proof. For a pessimistic voter we can even give a single sincere strategy that will weakly dominate all strategies for a given situation. This strategy is to approve of the most preferred pivotal candidate c and all candidates preferred to c (if any). The outcome will be {c}, which for a pessimist dominates all other outcomes including at least one pivotal candidate. As only outcomes including pivotal candidates are feasible, this completes the proof. 2
Naturally, optimism and pessimism are very strong assumptions, so the range of scenarios where Theorems 5 and 6 will be applicable is certainly rather limited. The following results will have much wider appeal.
Main Theorem and Consequences
We now prepare the ground to prove our main theorem. We shall require two further axioms. The first of these is a technical axiom that is a weakening of the single-flip axiom (SIF) introduced earlier in the context of the Sen-Puppe Principle.
The axiom expresses that when b is strictly preferred to a, then, in any given context, it is either beneficial to exchange a for b, to just obtain b, or to just give away a. 20 Clearly, (SIF) entails (WSF),
but not vice versa.
21
Our final axiom, the deletion axiom, specifies a sufficient condition for being able to delete an element from a set of candidates without diminishing its attractiveness.
This is an intuitively appealing axiom, that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been considered in the literature before.
22 It expresses that the attractiveness of a set A will not be diminished if we delete one of its less preferable elements, where an element is judged to be "less preferable" if obtaining it on its own is strictly less preferable to obtaining A.
23
Finally, we require a means of comparing the degree of insincerity of two ballots. Given any two ballots B, B ⊆ C, we write B B and say that ballot B is strictly more insincere than ballot B if and only if either B is insincere while B is sincere, or both B and B are insincere and one of the following two conditions is satisfied:
20 Note that the third disjunct on the lefthand side of (WSF) should be read as "A = {a} and A \{a} A", to avoid stating a preference of the empty set over A ( is only defined for pairs of nonempty sets).
21 Why (SIF) itself is not sufficient for our purposes will become clear in the proof of Theorem 9 22 Note that, equivalently though less succinctly, we could have phrased the precondition for (DEL) as "if A {a} and A \ {a} = ∅". The reason is that the intended interpretation of is as a relation on nonempty sets; so any statements about how the empty set relates to some other set are irrelevant.
23 The dual axiom, postulating A ∪ {a} A whenever {a} A, may also be of independent interest, but is not required for our present purposes.
Condition (i) says that a ballot becomes more sincere as the top disapproved candidate (that must dominate at least one approved candidate, and therefore may be considered an indicator of insincerity) becomes a less preferred candidate. Condition (ii) says that a ballot becomes more sincere as the number of approved candidates dominated by the top disapproved candidate reduces (while the top disapproved candidate himself remains the same). For example, we have [1010] [1101] by condition (i), and [011] [010] by condition (ii). Observe that the relation induces a ranking on ballots and the sincere ballots are exactly those that are minimal with respect to .
We now state the theorem. It establishes the fact that any voter with preferences that satisfy (WSF) and (DEL) on top of the Kelly Principle will never have an incentive to not vote by means of a sincere ballot. As we shall see, the theorem subsumes several similar results for intuitively appealing assumptions of set preferences, as discussed in Section 3. All of these results are independent of the number of candidates running for election.
Theorem 7 Under AV, any strategy available to a voter who knows all other ballots and whose preferences satisfy (KEL), (WSF) and (DEL) is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy.
Proof. Lemma 6 applies, so we only need to show that any strategy that involves approving of subpivotal and insignificant candidates only is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy. Recall that in case our voter votes by means of a ballot not approving of any pivotal candidates, the set of winners will be the union of the set of pivotal candidates and the set of approved subpivotal candidates.
Let B ⊆ C be any insincere ballot not approving of a pivotal candidate and let W ⊆ C be the outcome forced by voting by means of B. We shall describe a procedure for turning B into an new ballot B such that all of the following conditions are satisfied: Condition (c) ensures that the same procedure will be applicable to B as well. If we can define such a procedure, then the proof is complete, because it provides us with a method for turning any insincere ballot not approving of any pivotal candidates into a sincere ballot weakly dominating the former by means of a finite number of applications of that procedure. We now describe the transformation procedure. Given B, define c as the most preferred candidate that is not approved by B, i.e., c = max(C \B). Note that, because B is insincere by assumption, c is well-defined and there exists a candidate that c is preferred to and that is approved. Then, depending on the type of c, apply one of the following transformations:
• First, suppose c is insignificant. Then let B = B ∪{c}; that is, we approve of c in the new ballot and otherwise keep everything as it is. This satisfies all three conditions: (a) the outcome is not affected; (b) B B by condition (i); and (c) B does not approve of any pivotal candidates.
• Next, suppose c is subpivotal. We distinguish two cases:
-If there is an approved subpivotal candidate c that is less preferred than c, then proceed as follows. Note that c ∈ W . By approving of c we can add c to the winning set W ; and by disapproving c we can delete c from W . By (WSF), we must have
The new outcome will be W = (W \{c }) ∪ {c}. All three conditions will be satisfied: (a) W W ; (b) B B by condition (i); and (c) B does not approve of any pivotal candidates.
Otherwise, if W ∪ {c} W , let B = B ∪ {c}. The new outcome will be W = W ∪ {c}. All three conditions will be satisfied: (a) W W ; (b) B B by condition (i); and (c) B does not approve of any pivotal candidates.
Otherwise, we must have W \{c } W . Then, let B = B \{c }. The new outcome will be W = W \{c }. All three conditions will be satisfied: (a) W W ; (b) B B by condition (ii); and (c) B does not approve of any pivotal candidates.
-Otherwise, there is no such subpivotal candidate, i.e., all approved candidates that are less preferred than c are insignificant. In this case, in the new ballot simply disapprove of all of these insignificant candidates, i.e., B = {b ∈ B | b> c}. That is, c will cease to dominate any approved candidates. Again, all three conditions are satisfied: (a) the outcome is not affected; (b) B B by condition (i); and (c) B does not approve of any pivotal candidates.
• Finally, suppose c is pivotal. We again distinguish two cases: -If {c} W , then change the ballot completely and define B = {a ∈ C | a˙ a * }, where a * is the most preferred pivotal candidate in C. The new outcome will be W = {a * }. This satisfies all three conditions, because W W by (KEL) and B is sincere.
-Otherwise, as is complete, it must be the case that W {c}. Choose an approved candidate c ∈ B that is less preferred than c. By our assumptions, such a candidate c does exist and cannot be pivotal. Now define the new ballot as B = B \{c }. This satisfies two of our three conditions: (b) B B by condition (ii); and (c) B does not approve of any pivotal candidates. To check condition (a) we require a final case distinction: If c is insignificant, then the outcome is not affected and condition (a) is satisfied. If c is subpivotal, then the new outcome will be W = W \{c }. We obtain W {c } from W {c} and c> c , and thus W \ {c } W from (DEL). Hence, condition (a) is satisfied also in this case.
This completes the proof of Theorem 7.
Theorem 7 has a number of interesting consequences. For any assumptions on voter preferences that entail the set of axioms mentioned in the theorem, we immediately obtain the same kind of result guaranteeing the absence of incentives to vote insincerely. As a first corollary of this type, we show that we get a positive result for voters conforming to the Kannai-Peleg Principle, under which a voter's preferences over sets of candidates depend only on her preferences over the maxima and minima of those sets.
Theorem 8 Under AV, any strategy available to a voter who knows all other ballots and whose preferences satisfy (GAR) and (MMX) is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy.
Proof. We need to show that axioms (GAR) and (MMX) together entail (KEL), (WSF) and (DEL). (The claim then follows Theorem 7.) By Lemma 2, (KEL) is entailed by (GAR). By Lemma 4, (GAR) and (MMX) entail (SIF), which in turn entails (WSF).
Finally, (DEL) is also entailed by (GAR) and (MMX): Assume (GAR) and (MMX), and take any set A ⊆ C and any a ∈ A such that A {a}. Then a cannot be the maximal element in A, as that would contradict (MAX). If a is the minimal element in A, then A \{a} A by (GF2). If a is neither the maximum nor the minimum of A, then A \{a} ∼ A by (MMX). Hence, in all cases (DEL) will be satisfied.
Next, we show that we get a further positive result for voters that conform to the Nitzan-Pattanaik Principle, according to which a voter's preferences over sets only depend on her preferences over the medians of those sets.
Theorem 9 Under AV, any strategy available to a voter who knows all other ballots and whose preferences satisfy (GAR) and (MED) is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy.
Proof. We need to show that (GAR) and (MED) entail (KEL), (WSF) and (DEL). By Lemma 2, (KEL) is entailed by (GAR). Next, assume (GAR) and (MED), and derive (WSF): Take any set A and any two candidates a and b such that b> a. If a ∈ A or b ∈ A, then (WSF) holds vacuously. So let a ∈ A and b ∈ A. If |A| is odd and thus med(A) and med((A \{a}) ∪ {b}) are both singletons, we obviously have med((A \{a}) ∪ {b}) med(A) and thus (A \{a}) ∪ {b} A. If |A| is even, then the situation is a little more subtle. In this case, let {m, m } = med(A) with m> m . We make an exhaustive case distinction by considering all possible positions of a with respect to m and m :
• If a> m, then med(A) = med((A \{a}) ∪ {b}). Thus, (SIF) is satisfied, as is (WSF).
• If a = m, then med(A ∪ {b}) = {m}. Thus, A ∪ {b} A and (WSF) is satisfied.
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• If m ˙ a, then med(A \{a}) = {m}. Thus, A \{a} A and (WSF) is satisfied.
Note that a cannot be strictly between m and m , because in that case a itself would have to belong to the median set. Hence, we have indeed covered all possible cases.
Finally, we show that (DEL) is satisfied as well: Take any set A and any candidate a ∈ A such that A {a}. By (MED), med(A) {a}. First consider the case where |A| is odd. Then med(A) = {m} for some m with m> a, and thus med(A \{a}) = {m , m} for some m with m > m. A \{a} A then follows from (GF1), as required. Now consider the case where |A| is even. Then med(A) = {m, m } for some m and m with m> m . It cannot be the case that m> a> m , because that would contradict {m, m } being the median set. It can also not be the case that a˙ m, because that would 24 Observe that this is a case where (SIF) would not be derivable using (GAR) and (MED) alone, because med((A \ {a}) ∪ {b}) = {m , m } for some m > m, and {m , m } and {m, m } are not ranked by the Gärdenfors Principle. This is why we chose to introduce the weaker axiom (WSF).
contradict med(A) {a}. Hence, we must have m ˙ a. This means that med(A \ {a}) = {m}. A \{a} A then follows from (GF2), and we are done.
As a final result, we show that if AV is used in combination with the uniform tie-breaking rule, voters whose preferences are based on utility functions and who are expected-utility maximisers will never have an incentive to vote insincerely.
Theorem 10 Under AV with uniform tie-breaking, any strategy available to a voter who knows all other ballots and who is an expected-utility maximiser is weakly dominated by some sincere strategy.
Proof. To be able to apply Theorem 7, we need to show that the set preferences of a voter who is an expected-utility maximiser and who expects ties to be broken uniformly will satisfy the axioms (KEL), (WSF), and (DEL). By Lemma 5, such a voter will certainly conform to (GAR) and (SIF), i.e., she will also conform to (KEL) and (WSF). (DEL) is also clearly satisfied: A \{a} A can only be falsified if a yields above-average utility amongst the candidates in A, in which case the precondition A {a} would not hold. 2
We emphasise that in Theorem 10 there is no assumption about the actual utility function underlying the preference order of the would-be manipulator. We only assume that some such function exists. Importantly, none of the sets of assumptions made in Theorems 8-10 entail any of the other sets of assumptions made in these theorems. Hence, while each of them follows from Theorem 7, they are all independent of one another and will apply for different types of societies.
Finally, observe that (KEL) together with either (OPT) or (PES) entails all of (KEL), (WSF) and (DEL); thus Theorems 5 and 6 are indeed corollaries of Theorem 7, as announced at the beginning of Section 5.2. More immediately, Theorems 5 and 6 also follow from Theorem 8, because optimism and pessimism each entail both (GAR) and (MMX).
Related Work
In this section, we review some closely related work on manipulation and sincerity under approval voting. In particular, this includes a number of contributions that are similar to our approach, but that are based on models that exhibit various (sometimes subtle) differences.
If voters have dichotomous preferences, then the can express their preferences truthfully using the AV balloting language, and the difficulties of defining strategy-proofness remarked on in the introductory section do not arise. Brams and Fishburn (1978, Theorem 3) show that AV is strategyproof if voters are assume to have dichotomous preferences. Of course, this immediately implies that in this case voters will not have an incentive to not vote by means of an insincere ballot, because the only sincere and proper ballot is also the one that is isomorphic to their true preference. Brams and Fishburn (1978) , as part of the same theorem, also show that no voter with trichotomous preferences will ever have an incentive to vote insincerely under AV, under assumptions on the corresponding set preference that are equivalent to the Gärdenfors Principle. As mentioned in Section 4.2, our Theorem 2 may be regarded as an immediate corollary to this result.
Central to both our approach and that of Brams and Fishburn (1978) is that we analyse scenarios where a would-be manipulator faces the decision on whether or not to vote insincerely (or more generally, to strategise) when she knows how many approvals each candidate will receive from the ballots of the other voters. In particular, this is the case when she knows how all the other voters intend to vote. If, instead, all that is known about the voting behaviour of the others are mixed strategies randomising over submitting several different ballots, then our results will not apply any longer. This kind of model has been studied, amongst others, by de Sinopoli et al. (2006) . For instance, suppose there are four candidates, we use AV with uniform tie-breaking, and all voters are expected-utility maximisers (i.e., as in Theorem 10). Now suppose there is just one other voter besides the would-be manipulator, and that other voter is using the following mixed strategy: with 50% probability submit ballot [1100] and with 50% probability submit ballot [0011] . Then it would be in the best interest of the manipulator to vote by means of the (insincere) ballot [1010] , to ensure that for either one of the two possible cases her favourite amongst the two pivotal candidates will get elected. The work of de Sinopoli et al. (2006) offers an intriguing game-theoretical perspective on AV; we have instead chosen to analyse the (classical) worst-case scenario where a manipulator is in possession of all the relevant information and we want to design a mechanism that still guarantees certain desirable properties.
Building on the work by Myerson and Weber (1993) , Laslier (2009) analyses a model in which voters are expected-utility maximisers who base their voting strategies on their beliefs regarding the probability of a tie between exactly two front-runners (neglecting the remote but non-zero probability of a tie between three and more candidates). The beliefs about these probabilities could, for instance, be based on polling data. Laslier (2009) is able to show that in this model voters will vote sincerely.
In recent work (Endriss et al., 2009) , under a slightly different model than the one adopted here, we show that voters never have an incentive to vote by means of an insincere ballot even under the Gärdenfors Principle (while in the present paper we were only able to obtain such general positive results under much stronger assumptions on ). The difference in the two models concerns the interpretation of . In the present model, each voter is assumed to have a complete (weak) preference order over candidate sets and the assumptions such as the Gärdenfors Principle (which in fact only induce a preorder rather than a weak order) encode those aspects of that actual order that we, the mechanism designers, know about. In the other model, is assumed to be the voter's actual (incomplete) preference order over candidate sets. In that model, the assumption is that voters are not always able to compare all sets (or possibly even all individual candidates), and when they cannot compare two sets they will by default opt for the sincere ballot. Hence, there are fewer potential reasons for manipulation, which explains why the results obtained can be more general under those assumptions. The "optimistic" model of (Endriss et al., 2009 ) seems appropriate when we accept that voters may have limited cognitive abilities and thus incomplete preferences and when it is reasonable to assume that in case of incomparability they will by default opt for a sincere ballot. The "cautious" model adopted in the present paper, on the other hand, seems appropriate when we take the perspective of a mechanism designer who believes (or at least considers it possible) that voters have complete preferences over sets of candidates, but is only willing to make limited assumptions regarding the principles that voters use to lift their preferences to preferences over sets. To be sure, under either model, the mechanism designer need not know anything about the voters' preferences over individual candidates (˙ ), except that they are total orders.
Our definition of sincerity is that of Brams and Fishburn (1978) . While this definition is intuitively appealing and arguably the standard definition as far as the literature on AV is concerned (see e.g. Brams and Fishburn, 2007; Laslier, 2009) , it is nevertheless not universally agreed upon (see e.g. Saari and van Newenhizen, 1988) . One argument against defining sincere ballots as those ballots that do not disapprove of a candidate preferred to any of the approved candidates is that it could be considered too permissive. Lemma 1 shows that we could label abstention ballots (approving of either all or none of the candidates) as insincere without having to give up any of our results, but this may still be considered too permissive. The problem, however, is that, without making additional assumptions (about some sort of true "cut-off point" as an additional feature of a voter's preference), it is difficult to give a sharper definition. Merrill and Nagel (1987) do make one such proposal. Under the assumption that each voter's preferences are based on some underlying utility function, they define a ballot as "purely sincere" if it approves of exactly those candidates that have above-average utility. That is, for any given preference (or rather, utility function) there is a unique sincere ballot. Unsurprisingly, under this very narrow nonstandard definition, Theorem 10 does not hold up any longer.
26 All other results cannot even be formulated against the background of such a definition of sincerity, because they do not presuppose the existence of an underlying utility function inducing the manipulator's preference order.
Simpler proposals, for instance to declare a ballot sincere if and only if it approves of exactly the top half of the candidates in a voter's ranking, are not attractive, because they immediately take us outside the realms of AV. Suppose we declare a ballot sincere only if it approves of the k top candidates of a given voter. Then we can immediately label any ballot that approves of strictly more or strictly less than k candidates as insincere. That is, if we do not want voters to vote insincerely (according to such a definition), we can simply restrict the ballot language and force voters to approve of exactly k candidates. The resulting voting procedures are sometimes called k-approval scoring rules. These are instances of the family of positional scoring rules (see e.g. Gaertner, 2006) , that have little in common with the original "philosophy" of the AV approach. Peters et al. (2008) offer an insightful analysis of the degree of manipulability of k-approval scoring rules.
In the introduction we cited Dowding and van Hees (2008) , who challenged the view that manipulability is necessarily a bad thing in voting. In the context of ranked voting procedures, these authors propose a notion of sincere manipulation, not to be confused with the notion of sincere ballot discussed here. They argue that voting for the best possible alternative amongst those that are feasible should not be considered an insincere act. What alternatives are feasible depends on the strategies of the other voters; so this definition cannot be applied to individual ballots in isolation. Roughly speaking, Dowding and van Hees (2008) define insincere manipulation as voting by reporting a preference that untruthfully ranks some candidate x over some other candidate y but results in y being elected. Their main technical result states that the plurality rule is immune to this kind of insincere manipulation.
Thus, both the formal framework employed (which does not apply to nonranked procedures such as AV) and the kind of question investigated by Dowding and van Hees (2008) differ from the work described here.
Finally, we point out that work on "domain restrictions" as a means of enabling strategy-proof social choice (see e.g. Black, 1958; Sen, 1966; Barberà, 2001; Gaertner, 2001 ) differs from our approach. The former is about formulating restrictions on admissible profiles ˙ 1 , . . . ,˙ m of the preferences of m voters over the (individual) candidates. The classical example is the single-peakedness condition of Black (1958) . In our approach, on the other hand, we do not impose any restrictions on any voter's preference order˙ , but instead formulate restrictions on the possible ranges of set preferences . Importantly, we only discuss restrictions that can be expressed on a voter-by-voter basis, while singlepeakedness and its various generalisations expresses restrictions on the range of allowed combinations of the preferences of all voters.
Concluding Remarks
To conclude, let us briefly summarise our results. We have been able to show that, under certain assumptions concerning the principles that govern how voters extend their preferences over individual candidates to sets of candidates, the system of approval voting can offer protection against insincere voting in the sense that a voter who has been able to obtain complete information regarding the voting intentions of the others 27 will never have an incentive to manipulate the election by means of entering a ballot that is not a sincere reflection of her true preferences. Specifically, this is so if voters are known to base their preferences over sets only on the maxima and minima of those sets (Theorem 8), if they base them only on the medians of those sets (Theorem 9), or if ties are broken uniformly and voters are known to be expected utility-maximisers (Theorem 10), i.e., if they base their preferences over sets only on the "averages" of those sets. In all these cases, a voter will never have an incentive to vote insincerely, independently of the number of candidates standing for election. The same kind of guarantee can be given if voters are known to be either optimistic (Theorem 5) or pessimistic (Theorem 6). The most general result of this kind is Theorem 7.
For elections with small numbers of candidates, we have shown that the absence of incentives to vote insincerely can be established under even weaker assumptions. For the widely accepted Gärdenfors Principle, this is the case for elections with three candidates (Theorem 2, a known result) and only minimal additional assumptions are required to extend this guarantee to the case of four candidates (Theorem 3). Similar results for even weaker or somewhat stronger assumptions on set preferences (Theorems 1 and 4, and the data reported in Table 3 ) give a clear picture of the situation for elections with few candidates. By Lemma 1, all our results are independent of whether or not we allow voters to abstain and whether or not we classify abstention ballots as sincere or insincere expressions of preference.
At the methodological level, we have argued that computers can play a role in establishing theoretical results in social choice theory, independently from their wide-spread and accepted use for the purpose of simulations (and for carrying out complex calculations).
Finally, we believe that the deletion axiom formulated in Section 5.3, which to the best of our knowledge has not yet been considered in the literature on extending preferences on sets to their powersets, may be of independent interest for that line of work. The axiom expresses the intuitively appealing principle that a decision maker should not object to removing an element from a set if she strictly prefers the full set to that element in isolation.
Concerning future directions, our work immediately raises two important questions. The first of these is to what extent our results continue to hold if we assume that voters have preferences over individual candidates that are weak orders rather than total orders. The second is the question to what extent (small) groups of voters (rather than individuals) may benefit from voting insincerely under approval voting.
• We can infer A B according to the Gärdenfors Principle if and only if A2 and B2 are equal for some division into sublists.
• We can infer A B according to the Sen-Puppe Principle if and only if the following procedure succeeds for some division into sublists: Move simultaneously through both A2 and B2, from left to right. At each position, apply the appropriate rule:
-If the remaining two lists to the right of the current position are equal, stop and succeed (that is, succeed immediately if A2 and B2 were equal to begin with).
-If either both lists have a 1 or both lists have a 0 at the current position, move on to the next position.
-If there is a 1 at the current position in A2 and at 0 in B2, then flip the next available 1 in B2 to a 0 (stop and fail if there is no such 1), and move on to the next position.
-If there is a 0 at the current position in A2 and a 1 in B2, then stop and fail.
(Observe how this procedure directly simulates Sen's pairwise dominance condition.)
The algorithm for checking weak dominance is very similar. There are only two differences. First, it is not necessary for one of A1 and B3 to contain a 1. Second, for the Kelly Principle we can also infer A B if for some division into sublists both A2 and B2 are equal to a list consisting of just a single 1. The implementation of these three algorithms is given in Table 4 . The predicate split/4 is used to split two given lists into three sublists each such that the respective lengths of the sublists line up. It uses the standard built-in predicates append/3 (for appending two lists to obtain a third) and length/2 (for obtaining the length of a list). We take advantage of the fact that Prolog is a declarative language: we merely need to specify the constraints on the lists involved (which lists, if appended, have to match which other lists and which lists need to have equal length), and the Prolog interpreter will generate all possible divisions on command. To check whether one outcome strictly dominates another we use the predicate sdominates/3. The first argument is an identifier for the axiom system to be used (kel for the Kelly Principle, gar for the Gärdenfors Principle, and s p for the Sen-Puppe Principle). The first line in the body of sdominates/3 takes care of the splitting into sublists, the second line checks that A3 and B1 are made up of 0's only, and the third line ensures that at least one of A1 and B3 contains a 1 (using the built-in predicate member/2 for checking membership in a list). The fourth line calls the rule/3 predicate. If the first argument of rule/3 is kel, then it simply checks that the other two arguments are both equal to the empty list. If it is gar, then we only need to check that the two lists supplied are equal. If it is s p, then we need to execute the procedure outlined above. Here, the step where we need to flip the next available 1 into a 0 is taken care of by the predicate flip/2. The implementation of the predicate wdominates/3 for checking weak dominance is almost the same as that of sdominates/3. Note that we have included the additional option for the Kelly Principle, where both A2 and B2 are equal to a list consisting of a single 1, within the body of wdominates/3. This is valid, because the same inference is in fact also sanctioned by the Gärdenfors Principle and the Sen-Puppe Principle, and it simplifies the presentation of the code.
